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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

TRIBUTE TO THE MEMORY OF ALFONSO GARCIA ROBLES, AMBASSADOR OF MEXICO

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the memory of Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico and, on behalf of the members of the First Committee as well as on my own behalf, to express to the delegation of Mexico and to his family our heartfelt condolences on his passing.

Ambassador Robles, who was known to many of us as the "father of disarmament", was the architect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the first treaty to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated region of the world. As members are all aware, he was also the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1982, which was awarded to him for his outstanding service in the cause of disarmament and peace.

Ambassador Robles was the main initiator of the World Disarmament Campaign, was a member of the Palme Commission on Common Security, the planning group of the Six-Nation Peace Initiative and served with distinction on the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters.

Although most members of the Committee know of Ambassador Robles' contributions to disarmament, it is worth noting that he was also a member of the Mexican delegation to the 1945 Conference in San Francisco, which was instrumental in drafting the Charter of the United Nations. Subsequently, he became Director of the Political Division of the United Nations Secretariat, Principal Secretary of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and of the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly on the Question of Palestine. n 1957 he resumed his services with the Government of Mexico. He was appointed Ambassador to Brazil and, subsequently, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs and then Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(The Chairman)

Alfonso Garcia Robles was indefatigable in his struggle for disarmament. Those who worked with him here in the First Committee, in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere will certainly always remember his energy, his steadfast determination and his devotion. The First Committee has immensely benefited from Ambassador Garcia Robles' wisdom, great knowledge and expertise in the field of disarmament in the past several years. His death is certainly a great loss not only to his country, but also to the international community, especially to the First Committee.

I now call on the representative of Ethiopia, who will speak on behalf of the Group of African States.

Mr. MAHMOUD (Ethiopia): I would like, on behalf of the African Group in the First Committee, and on my own behalf, to pay a tribute to the memory of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, who passed away on 2 September.

Those who are familiar with the work achieved by the Committee, particularly from 1971 to 1975, will miss Mr. Garcia Robles, who was Mexico's Permanent Representative here, and can vouch for the invaluable contribution he made to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As is widely recognized, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - the Treaty of Tlatelolco - could not have been signed in 1967 without his painstaking and courageous efforts. That Treaty was, without doubt, an encouragement for the creation of other nuclear-free areas. And, as the Chairman has just stated, it was in recognition of his contribution to the promotion of peace and disarmament that Mr. Garcia Robles was awarded the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden.

Speaking in the First Committee on 23 November 1973, Mr. Garcia Robles said:

(Mr. Mahmoud, Ethiopia)

"The crossroads at which the world finds itself, therefore, is this: to go either towards the destruction of nuclear weapons or towards resignation to our own disappearance." (A/C.1/PV.1968, p. 8-10)

I am sure that he would have been quite gratified by the recent indications given by the President of the United States and the President of the Soviet Union to reduce certain certain tactical nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, I should like to express the sincere condolences of the African Group in the First Committee to the bereaved family of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles and to the delegation of Mexico.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Japan, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Asian States.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): I deem it a great honour on this occasion to pay a tribute, on behalf of the Asian Group, to the life and memory of Ambassador Garcia Robles.

Diplomat, world statesman and Nobel laureate, Ambassador Garcia Robles dedicated his life to world peace and security. In a career spanning five decades, Ambassador Garcia Robles impressed all who had the privilege of working with him as a man of great vision, profound wisdom and unerring integrity. As Mexico's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, as its Minister for Foreign Affairs and as its representative to the Conference on Disarmament from 1977 until his retirement in 1989, Ambassador Garcia Robles was an exemplary servant of his country. His achievements have benefited not only Mexico, but also the international community as a whole.

Ambassador Garcia Robles, who was present at the signing of the Charter of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, remained deeply committed to the goals and purposes of the United Nations throughout his career; he left an

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

indelible imprint on the work and accomplishments of the Organization, particularly in the field of disarmament. Indeed, he was at the forefront of major international efforts to promote disarmament, serving as President of the Conference on Disarmament several times and participating in the drafting of important international agreements on disarmament, including the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1978.

Although we are all diminished by the death of this great man, his contributions to world peace and security constitute a legacy that will endure for generations to come.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call upon the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who will speak on behalf of the Eastern European Group of States.

Mr. KRASULIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): On behalf of the Eastern Europe Group of States, I would like to pay a tribute to an outstanding individual and diplomat, Alfonso Garcia Robles. Throughout all of his professional life, Ambassador Garcia Robles was devoted to trying to resolve international problems by non-violent means.

Many of us associate his name with disarmament alone, but in fact the range of his activities was much wider than that. One recalls that he was present at the very birth of the United Nations, participating in the San Francisco Conference of 1945, when the Charter of the Organization was ratified. From the very beginning of the Organization's existence, he worked in the General Political Division of the United Nations, and many of us are aware that when he was working in the Secretariat Ambassador Garcia Robles was the first person under whom Under-Secretary-General Akashi worked.

Ambassador Garcia Robles made an enormous contribution to the activities of our Organization in the area of peace keeping. Indeed, the body which we now call the Committee of 34 was founded essentially on his initiative. More than anything else, however, Ambassador Garcia Robles will go down in the history of disarmament as the father of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Even if that were all he had done, he would indeed deserve our tribute. We will all remember him.

We remember him in different ways. Some remember him as Ambassador Garcia Robles while others among us called him Alfonso. But I believe that we all agree that this man could rightly be called Mr. Disarmament. That is how we will remember him.

The CHAIRMAN: I now call on the representative of Honduras, who will speak on behalf of the Latin American and Caribbean Group.

Mr. FLORES BERMUDEZ (Honduras) (interpretation from Spanish): Today, we are beginning our work on agenda items relating to disarmament and international security. During this latter part of October, we shall be hearing the considered thoughts of many representatives who, with a deep sense of responsibility, will be analysing the recent past with a view to proposing measures and actions to be taken now for a better and more secure future.

One might feel that there is a voice missing here, that there is a void among us, that we are no longer benefiting from the lucid thinking which, throughout so many years, contributed to forging the world's awareness of the delicate matters of disarmament and international security. The death on 2 September of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles leaves us with the feeling that not all of us are present. None the less, his ideas and concepts will remain part of our work. His contribution to the items before us will remain as effective and important in future years as they are today.

It could not be otherwise, for we have benefited from his contributions over more than a quarter of a century. In 1967, Ambassador Garcia Robles came here to present the Treaty of Tlatelolco. He contributed significantly to the preparation of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of 1978. His role and ideas have been fundamental to the world campaign for disarmament undertaken by our Organization.

Don Alfonso was educated in Europe and had completed his legal training at the University of Paris by 1936. He later obtained the diploma of the Academy of International Law at The Hague. His professional work and lengthy diplomatic experience in the service of the Mexican Government enabled him to

(Mr. Flores Bermudez, Honduras)

contribute his brilliant skills as one of the very first international civil servants in the Organization. He occupied the position of Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico from 1964 to 1970. At that time, he resumed his work on disarmament in the United Nations and headed his country's delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

In his capacity as Under-Secretary, Alfonso Garcia Robles presided over all meetings on the military denuclearization of Latin America that were held in Mexico City from 1964 onwards. As has been said, these meetings culminated in the ratification, on 14 February 1967, of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

The representative of Mexico in Geneva, Ambassador Marin Bosch, in his book Alfonso Garcia Robles, Nobel de la Paz, says:

> "It could be said that the professional career of Ambassador Garcia Robles is intimately linked to the United Nations. His training took place within the Organization that he himself helped to strengthen. He personally contributed to the preparatory work leading to the establishment of the United Nations and, since then, has vigourously defended the principles of the Charter. Indeed, it could be said in paraphrase of Alfonso the Wise that Garcia Robles not only was present at the creation of the United Nations but indeed had occasion to contribute ideas to its better structuring and greater effectiveness."

The quotation continues:

> "Alfonso Garcia Robles belongs to a generation of internationalists who witnessed the successive crises of the 1930s, the toppling of the League of Nations and the tragedy of the Second World War. They were aware of the need to create a more just and lasting international order

(Mr. Flores Bermudez, Honduras)

and devoted themselves to that noble cause from 1945 onwards. His enthusiasm was shared by representatives of the founding countries of the United Nations and by international civil servants who, like Garcia Robles himself, joined the Secretariat of the Organization. The professional level of the first civil servants was very high and was in conformity with their human qualities."

In expressing our deepest condolences to the bereaved family, and the people and present delegation of Mexico, the Latin American and Caribbean Group wishes in this way to pay a tribute to the illustrious Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, Nobel Laureate of 1982, a Mexican by birth, a Latin American by conviction, and a man of universal dimensions through his struggle for international peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Norway, Ambassador Martin Huslid, who will speak on behalf of the Group of Western European and other States.

Mr. HUSLID (Norway): For all of us who knew Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles - and I was glad to be one of them - the news of his passing away was received with sadness and emotion. In Alfonso Garcia Robles, the world lost one of its most dedicated and indefatigable spokesmen for peace, disarmament and security.

Ambassador Garcia Robles had clear goals and great visions regarding disarmament, reflected in, among other things, his comprehensive programme for disarmament. He worked untiringly for his goals and his visions in spite of, it must be admitted, frequent lack of progress in a difficult environment. But this quality was part of the greatness of the man: to work steadfastly towards the goals that he knew to be right, notwithstanding opposition and difficulties.

I shall not say any more about Ambassador Garcia Robles' professional achievements. You, Mr. Chairman, and others have already enumerated them. They will stand for posterity. I shall just add one thing, and all of us who had the privilege of knowing him and being his friends can testify to it: Alfonso Garcia Robles was a kind, gentle man with whom it was always pleasant and, I would say, enriching to talk. Personally I am convinced that there was a clear link between the kindness and gentleness in the character of Ambassador Garcia Robles and the causes to which he chose to dedicate his life.

In Alfonso Garcia Robles, we have lost a fine man, a good friend and colleague and an outstanding defender of peace in the world. His memory will remain with us and it should be an inspiration for us all.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the family of Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles and the Mexican Government, I am very deeply grateful for this tribute. This room, Conference Room 4, had a very special meaning to Mr. Garcia Robles and for that reason we are most grateful for all that has just been said in this forum.

As has been said here, the professional life of Ambassador Garcia Robles encompassed a turbulent and contradictory half-century. There were dark years and hopeful years. When he completed his post-graduate studies in Paris and The Hague, Ambassador Garcia Robles was invited to give a series of lectures in Europe on a very controversial subject: the reason for the nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938.

On the eve of the outbreak of the Second World War, he joined the diplomatic service. After the storm there ensued the promise of a better world, and Alfonso Garcia Robles was present at its creation: first, at the Latin American level, at the Conference of Chapultepec, and later at that of San Francisco.

After a decade as Director of the Department of Political Affairs for the United Nations, he rejoined our foreign service. He was a delegate to the first conferences on the Law of the Sea, Ambassador to Brazil and - as Under-Secretary for Multilateral Affairs - the architect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

During the complex negotiations on that Treaty, there was an incident that reveals his stature. At the Mexican Ministry there were those who wished to leave aside the negotiations, and at one particularly difficult stage it was suggested to him that perhaps even the President of the Republic shared that idea. Under-Secretarty Garcia Robles requested an appointment with the

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

President and persuaded him not to abandon the endeavour. The Treaty was signed in 1967.

He was my country's representative here in New York from 1970 to 1975, when he was named Secretary for Foreign Relations. From 1977 onwards he devoted himself completely to his work. His contribution to disarmament was recognized in 1982, when, together with Mrs. Alva Myrdal, he received the Nobel Peace Prize. In addition to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, he participated actively in the negotiation of the various multilateral instruments at the Eight-Nation Conference in Geneva, later the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and in the restructuring of that body.

As has already been pointed out here, he played a decisive role in the preparation of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. He was the most enthusiastic promoter of the World Disarmament Campaign and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Certainly, he was not always the favourite representative of the great military Powers; but everyone respected him, especially his colleagues in Geneva at what was at first the Group of Eight and is now the Group of 21.

I was lucky enough to work with Ambassador Garcia Robles from the day I entered the Foreign Service and I had the good fortune to be honoured with his friendship. His personal style can be summed up in a phrase that he often used: suaviter in modo, fortiter in re.

He was a teacher for several generations of Mexican diplomats and a point of reference and a counsellor for many political leaders in my country. His opinions were well founded, which is why people listened to him. More than anything else, he was a faithful interpreter of the foreign-policy principles of my country and was therefore a good friend to the United Nations and a

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

tireless defender of its noble aims and ideals. An internationalist par excellence, he faithfully served universal causes.

The CHAIRMAN: A memorial service for Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles will be held in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library auditorium at United Nations Headquarters on Monday, 28 October, at 1.30 p.m.

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN: Before I call on the first speaker on the list for this meeting, allow me to make a short statement as the presiding officer of this body of the General Assembly.

Over the years, our deliberations in this Committee have proceeded in a broad context encompassing a wide range of issues related to arms control and disarmament. Among the aspects discussed, major focus has been placed on substantial and sustained reductions in the global level of nuclear weapons, leading eventually to their elimination. In this spirit, we welcome the dramatic and far-reaching announcements in the last three weeks by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev calling for the destruction, elimination or withdrawal of the land- and sea-based short-range nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States. In this connection, I fully associate myself with the statement of the Secretary-General in reaction to the 27 September initiative of President Bush and the 5 October response of President Gorbachev in which he expressed his hope that:

> "these two important and dramatic initiatives will provide a new momentum to the efforts to achieve further significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals, contribute to greater stability and lead to the adoption of additional steps towards the objective of a comprehensive test ban..."

and urged

> "the other nuclear-weapon States to consider responding to President Gorbachev's invitation that they join in this bilateral effort."

We are also encouraged by the decision of both sides to remove several of their weapons systems from battle alert status. Such measures to eliminate, reduce, or "stand down" nuclear weapons systems will certainly decrease the likelihood of any nuclear incident between the two largest nuclear Powers.

(The Chairman)

The recent announcements from Washington and Moscow are indeed momentous, for they underscore the belief of many that mutual stability can be enhanced through the reduction of nuclear weapons. It is a sign of the historic times in which we live that two former rivals could issue statements in the space of eight days announcing the destruction, elimination or withdrawal of land- and sea-based short-range weapons, when only last July, the international community praised the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which stretched over nine years of negotiations. The first arms control agreement mandating the actual reduction of strategic or long-range nuclear arms, START, cuts these weapons by one third and establishes strict monitoring and verification provisions. As a number of Member States pointed out during the general debate in plenary session, speedy ratification of START by the United States and the Soviet Union would be a propitious way to lock in the reductions which have been negotiated.

It will, however, surprise no one that even in a post-START world, there are still sufficient stockpiles of nuclear weapons to eradicate life and civilization from this planet. Nevertheless, START has underlined the prospect that the process of seeking mutual stability at lower levels of nuclear armaments is realistic and attainable. To become universal, such a process should eventually incorporate the nuclear arms of the other nuclear-weapon States and address the question of conventional arms and the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this connection the recent initiatives of President Bush and President Mitterrand are to be applauded.

(The Chairman)

On the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the recent declarations of intent of China and France concerning their accession to the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are practical signs of the strengthening of the Treaty and augur well for its universalization. Despite reports of non-compliance in certain instances with its nuclear safeguards system, the Treaty continues to command respect as the most widely adhered-to arms limitation instrument and the cornerstone of an effective non-proliferation regime.

On the issue of nuclear-weapon testing, the recent unilateral announcement by the Soviet Union concerning a one-year moratorium on testing, represents an encouraging development. At the multilateral level, it will be recalled that informal, open-ended consultations were recently held at Headquarters by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, who, as President of the Amendment Conference of States Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, had been mandated in January to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on outstanding issues and to resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time. A broad agreement was informally reached concerning the modality for continuing the consultations of the President.

Events in the Middle East over the course of the year have once again underscored the urgency of a global and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. In Geneva, the Conference on Disarmament decided to further mandate its Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons to intensify, as a priority task, the negotiations on a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, with a view to achieving a final agreement on the

(The Chairman)

convention by 1992. Several outstanding elements of the Convention, such as verification and legal and institutional issues, are receiving further consideration.

On the subject of biological weapons, and, in particular, endeavours to strengthen the 1972 biological weapons Convention, further confidence-building measures were elaborated in September at the Third Review Conference of the Convention held in Geneva. On the question of verification, an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts was established at the Review Conference to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. It was decided that the Group of Experts would be convened in Geneva early next year to work on a verification study using a set of criteria agreed upon at the Review Conference.

As the Committee is aware, increasing attention has been given recently to the question of conventional weapons. Last November in Paris three historic agreements were reached in this area: the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) was signed, and at the summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures was endorsed, and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe - a document formally ending the cold war - was adopted. A few months later, the Warsaw Pact was formally disbanded and conventional armaments in Europe were ready to be destroyed, reduced or limited, while the CFE Treaty is being ratified and until it enters into force.

(The Chairman)

In a number of countries foreign military forces have begun to be reduced in number or withdrawn. Encouraging developments have been witnessed in other areas of the world also. It is my sincere hope that the question will receive fresh impetus following the recent accession by South Africa to the 1968 nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. In this context, the Committee will recall that Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe have acceded to the Treaty.

In Latin America, a number of countries, through the Declaration of Foz do Iguacu and the Declaration of Mendoza, have forsworn the use of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. The Central American Security Commission continues to carry out its programme of work, while the Rio Group of countries prepares for a special meeting on regional disarmament in Latin America.

As events in several regions of the world have shown, increasing pressure to expand weapons sales abroad as a means of cushioning the shock of cuts in military spending at home may have the effect of facilitating the transfer of arms to areas of strife. Surplus arms from areas of former tension could thus deepen the conflagration in strife-torn areas. In his latest annual report, the Secretary-General expressed grave concern about the problem of excessive and destabilizing transfers of conventional armaments. The needs of both the suppliers and the recipients of arms should be taken into account with a view to establishing fair criteria for the multilateral control of arms transfers, without prejudice to the legitimate security needs of States.

In this context, it is possible that the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms" - a report prepared with the assistance of qualified experts - which is being submitted to the General Assembly, may

(The Chairman)

stimulate a constructive Committee debate on this subject. Taking into consideration the views of Member States, the report, inter alia, recommends the establishment of a universal and non-discriminatory arms-transfers register under the auspices of the United Nations. As was indicated in the General Assembly's general debate, the 12 States members of the European Community, Japan and some other States are contemplating the introduction of a specific draft resolution on the subject.

It is important, at this juncture, to note that disarmament agreements - whether regional, bilateral or multilateral - should incorporate measures making it obligatory for the contracting parties to exercise restraint in the transfer, to other regions and countries, of armaments made redundant by agreements. The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe is a case in point.

While increasing attention has been focused on the question of international arms transfers, there is also growing consensus on the need to extend disarmament efforts beyond the nuclear and conventional arsenals of the great Powers and their allies. As the Foreign Minister of my country said a few weeks ago, during the General Assembly's general debate, the developing world is spending $200 billion annually on armaments. As a proportion of gross national product, this is much higher than in the case of the developed States. It must be equally understood, however, that all States have the right to meet their own legitimate defence needs, with a view to maintaining internal order and protecting their national territory from armed attack.

As we move closer to the dawn of a new world order, events in the Persian Gulf and in Europe remind us that a newly emerging system of collective security does not automatically guarantee the maintenance of international peace and stability. Sources of conflict and strife - whether in the

(The Chairman)

political, the economic or the social sphere - remain. We must continue to give attention to the need to find agreed solutions to both military and non-military threats to security and to global challenges of a social, humanitarian, economic or ecological nature.

As the Committee is aware, the United Nations has a central role and a primary responsibility in the field of disarmament. The dramatic improvement, in the last two years, in the international climate has provided the Organization with a renewed opportunity to fulfil the principles set forth in the Charter.

For the First Committee there is a considerable amount of difficult work ahead, but I am confident of the support and cooperation of all members. I am also counting on the high level of competence of the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

AGENDA ITEMS 47 TO 65

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now begin the general debate on all disarmament items.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Please accept the congratulations of the delegation of Mexico, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee of the General Assembly. The world is changing rapidly, and the political, military, ideological and economic transformations will have their impact on disarmament negotiations in this and other multilateral forums. You, Sir, will therefore have an opportunity to contribute to the tracing of new and, we hope, better paths. In the discharge of your important task you can count on the full cooperation of my delegation.

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

The breezes of change that began blowing some five years ago were followed by ever-stronger winds, which last August became truly historic hurricanes. The First World War signalled the collapse of a century-old political order, and after the Second World War a new kind of order emerged. It was based on ideological rivalry, which translated into history's greatest arms race. It is difficult to foresee the type of world in which we shall be living in 20 years' time, but what is already an inescapable reality is that it will be very different from the world of the cold war. With the United Nations Charter as our point of departure, all of us - and I underline "all" - must ensure that the new world order is more just. Disarmament - in each and every one of its most relevant aspects - should appear among the priorities of that new order.

For almost five decades the world was held hostage by the ideological and military competition between the super-Powers and their allies. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up, we were told, was based on military doctrines of deterrence. Over the years these were defended as if they were divine revelations. They were always difficult to justify - but today more than ever. We must ensure that reason will be our guide in the twenty-first century.

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

Today new paths towards disarmament have been opened. There is an increasing number of initiatives - initiatives of all kinds. Those who sell the most conventional weapons now want to put order - and some transparency - into the transfer of those weapons. Those who sold the most missiles now want to control their proliferation. Those who have spent the most for military purposes now wish or are constrained to cut those expenses. Those who built the most tanks now want to convert them into tractors.

However, one thing has not changed: the stagnation of the work of the Conference on Disarmament on seven of its eight agenda items. The Conference on Disarmament - the only multilateral negotiating organ for disarmament - is only negotiating a draft convention for a complete ban on chemical weapons. There is no movement at all on the other priority items: a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, nuclear disarmament, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear security assurances, and the programme of comprehensive disarmament.

Every year the General Assembly urges the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate in Geneva agreements on those items, and, except for chemical weapons, each autumn the Conference on Disarmament arrives empty-handed in New York, as shown in its annual report (A/46/27). We are told what an important role the United Nations has in regard to international security, but little is done within the United Nations on disarmament. The emerging new world order will make sense only if the United Nations plays the central role that all its Member States have assigned to it for the achievement of disarmament measures.

What are the main challenges and threats facing us in the field of armament? In the first place, nuclear weapons are still being produced,

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

stockpiled and tested. Then there are the other weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical weapons; and there are signs that soon we shall have a multilateral agreement on their elimination. Another challenge is the environmental impact of toxic waste - chemical agents and so on - and nuclear waste. What are we going to do with military waste when we still do not know what to do about toxic waste from civilian industries? A fourth subject is the militarization of outer space. A fifth is the naval arms race. A sixth is the proliferation of ballistic missiles. A seventh is the arms trade and conventional weapons in general.

On almost all of the aforementioned questions it is still unclear how we should proceed in order to find an appropriate solution. Even with regard to the convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons certain problems persist. It is true that the negotiations in Geneva have intensified this year as a result of the change in the United States position on the prohibition of the use of such weapons and on their unconditional destruction; but there are still some outstanding problems.

The first problem is that of the system for the verification of the future convention on chemical weapons. Twenty years ago we were told that it was not possible to verify compliance with a total ban on chemical weapons. Now we all recognize that the future convention's verification system must be universally acceptable, non-discriminatory and cost-effective.

It should be noted that several types of verification measures are being considered. One is the rather routine system of verifying non-production by the chemical industry of certain substances for civilian purposes. Here care will have to be taken to ensure that the provisions agreed upon do not turn into a mechanism for controlling the chemical industry. The other type of

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

verification measures is rather exceptional - a kind of last resort in the event that one party has serious doubts about the compliance of another party with its obligations under the convention. I refer to the challenge inspections. The principles that should guide this kind of action are those of "anywhere, anytime, and without the right of refusal". It will therefore be important that in conducting those inspections and in assessing their results one remain within a strictly multilateral framework. Even then, as the recent experience of the United Nations in Iraq demonstrates, there is the risk of divided loyalties among the inspectors.

With regard to the executive council of the organization for the prohibition of chemical weapons, the basic criteria for determining its membership should be that of equitable geographical distribution. When considering other criteria, such as chemical industrial capacity, we must envisage a mechanism that will allow those criteria to be examined periodically.

Another unresolved question is the way in which the organization's costs will be distributed. We do not think that it should be based on the United Nations scale of assessments. Verification costs, especially during the 10-year destruction period, will be very high and should not be borne by States that have never had chemical weapons. In March this year the manager of the programme for chemical demilitarization of the United States informed the Conference on Disarmament that his country had estimated the life-cycle cost for the chemical stockpile disposal programme to be approximately $6.5 billion.

Has the time not come to include in the production cost of certain environment-threatening weapons the cost of their eventual destruction? Many

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

automobile manufacturers are now required to equip each car with a catalytic converter. Why not apply "the principle of catalytic converters" to armaments? Moreover, we should seek the establishment of an international mechanism to act as a clearing-house for the exchange of information on national experiences of the environmental effects of military activities, including development, production and destruction of weapons and weapon systems.

In this statement the delegation of Mexico would like to identify some of the most relevant aspects of the present situation in the disarmament field. The transition from a militarily bipolar and thus confrontational world to one of greater cooperation and understanding will not be very easy. This is borne out by the Persian Gulf war, the rise of nationalism in Europe and the persistent penury and political instability of some developing countries. Furthermore, some of the current trends in disarmament will certainly not make that transition any easier. A handful of countries cannot proclaim themselves the guardians of an international security that they themselves have defined according to their particular interests.

The non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological - and of their ballistic missiles is a subject that has acquired increasing importance in light of the Gulf war. At the same time, the indiscriminate trade in conventional arms - intensified by the voracity of the sellers and/or the mindlessness of the buyers - has become a general concern. Examples are the proposals made by the Group of 7 in London on 16 July last, and others such as that of France of 3 June, as well as the meetings in Paris of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

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The foregoing is part of a trend - one that is very evident - to increase the number of the so-called suppliers' cartels such as the "nuclear suppliers club", the "missile technology control regime" and the "Australia group" - chemical and biological materials - all of which are aimed at imposing export restrictions on equipment and technology. The same is occurring in the negotiations on the convention for the elimination of chemical weapons. This trend was also evident in September during the Third Review Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons.

The main feature of the initiatives taken so far with regard to non-proliferation relates to the preservation of a monopoly over such weapons and ballistic technology and "putting order" into the conventional arms trade. Some other way should be sought, one in which all States, especially those that have been participating actively in multilateral disarmament forums, can contribute to finding a lasting solution to this problem. To that end, it might be appropriate for the General Assembly to indicate the most useful mechanism for carrying out those discussions.

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The proliferation of weapons and military technologies has been a constant in history. From the dawn of the atomic age scientists and political leaders have been concerned about the dangers that the eventual proliferation of those weapons could entail. Only a few nations had the material resources and the scientific knowledge necessary to produce atomic bombs. Canada's unilateral decision and that of other European countries, together with constitutional bans imposed by the Allies on Germany and Japan, reduced even further the number of potential nuclear Powers.

With the 1963 Moscow Treaty the door to horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons was partially closed when testing was banned in the atmosphere, outer space and under water. But underground nuclear testing continues. Hence the importance that a vast majority of States Parties to the 1963 Treaty attach to the Amendment Conference aimed at converting it into a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the first international instrument aimed at preventing the horizontal proliferation of a specific type of weapon. To achieve this, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had to make certain concessions and commit themselves to negotiating agreements on vertical non-proliferation of those weapons. Since then the principle, proclaimed by the General Assembly, has been accepted that there should be a balance between undertakings by States not possessing certain weapons and States possessing them. This principle was reiterated in 1972 when the biological weapons Convention was concluded and it has also been invoked in ongoing negotiations on a chemical weapons convention. The General Assembly

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should, therefore, reiterate that principle when it deals with the question of what mechanism is to be established to consider non-proliferation in its broadest sense.

All States Parties to the NPT should encourage other countries to accede to it. But its universalization will not solve two key problems on nuclear-weapons proliferation: first, the verification system whose shortcomings became evident recently when it was revealed that Iraq - a Party to the Treaty - had been violating it; and, secondly, the lack of fulfilment of its provisions on nuclear disarmament.

The NPT contains certain provisions that had not been included previously in multilateral disarmament instruments. One is the five-year review conferences so that the Parties can assure themselves that all the Treaty's provisions are being implemented. The other is the provision that:

> "Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty". (resolution 2373 (XXII), annex, Article X.2)

Those provisions were included so that the non-nuclear-weapon States - which had committed themselves not to acquire them - would have the opportunity to assess the fulfilment of the balance of obligations between them and the nuclear-weapon countries. In other words, during the NPT negotiations in 1967 and 1968 a link was established between the NPT's limited duration and the fulfilment of its provisions regarding nuclear disarmament, that is, a comprehensive test ban and the reduction of the then existing

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nuclear arsenals. That link was proposed specifically by some of those countries at which the NPT was aimed: Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland, among others.

In 1995 the NPT will have to be extended. In other words, it will not expire; but rather agreement will have to be reached as to how long it will be extended and that decision will be taken by a majority of the States Parties. To ensure the 1995 conference's success, its preparatory phase should begin as soon as possible, preferably during early 1992.

Proper preparation for the conference is fundamental. It is equally necessary to begin at once a multilateral discussion regarding the subject of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic-missile systems. All nuclear-weapon States and a good number of non-nuclear-weapon States, including the so-called threshold countries, should participate in that discussion. Almost all are members of or observers at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It might therefore be a good idea to suggest that the multilateral discussion be held in Geneva within the Conference on Disarmament or outside its framework. We would prefer that it be held within the Conference on Disarmament.

To sum up: first, the cold war and the ideological conflicts served to justify an unbridled arms race and fuelled the horizontal and vertical proliferation of certain types of armaments, including weapons of mass destruction and their missiles.

Second, agreements signed to date in order to prevent the proliferation of certain weapons have not achieved their goal. The partial test-ban Treaty should be converted into a comprehensive ban and the NPT should be strengthened through its full implementation.

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Third, the trade in military technologies and conventional weapons continues to grow even after the tragic experience of the Gulf war.

Fourth, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the world should have in place a genuine and universal regime for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their ballistic missiles.

Fifth, the recent initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should be examined in a multilateral forum of the United Nations by all States directly interested. The United Nations General Assembly should address that question.

Sixth, the preparatory work of the 1995 NPT conference should begin early in 1992 in order to ensure its success. At the same time a multilateral mechanism should be established to encourage discussion on the various aspects of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their respective ballistic missiles, as well as on the conventional arms trade. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, which is about to conclude a draft convention on the elimination of chemical weapons, would perhaps be the proper forum for that discussion.

The statements made in recent weeks by the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear disarmament are very encouraging. Some years ago as a result of a Mexican initiative a Group of Governmental Experts appointed by the Secretary-General prepared a study entitled "Unilateral nuclear disarmament measures" (A/39/516). That Group of Experts, which I had the honour to chair, noted that for decades the arms race had intensified as a result of unilateral decisions of States, taken in the name of national security. Those decisions were then reciprocated by the other side and an "action/reaction" process was

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set in motion that led to the over-accumulation of weapons and weapons systems. The Group added - and I quote from the report:

> "Conversely, the process of de-escalation and reversal of the arms race and, in particular, the nuclear-arms race, could be promoted by unilateral initiatives of States." (A/39/516, para. 65)

In addition to the unilateral measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, the 1984 study identified four other priority areas: a nuclear-test ban; prevention of nuclear war, including the question of the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and a nuclear freeze; security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States; and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Therein lies the key to understanding fully the significance of what has been happening in recent days in the nuclear disarmament field. Even before ratifying the long-negotiated Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) signed last July, the United States and the USSR indicated their willingness to carry out unilateral reductions of various types of nuclear weapons and their missiles.

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When announcing his important unilateral initiative on 27 September last, the President of the United States pointed out that the nuclear disarmament steps that his country would be taking should be reciprocated by the other side. And the Soviet Union's positive response was not long in coming. In effect, on 5 October the President of the Soviet Union announced that his country would not only reciprocate the steps to be taken by the United States, but would go even further, including the unilateral suspension for one year of its nuclear tests.

We are thus witnessing what may perhaps be the beginning of the de-escalation of the nuclear-arms race. There are, of course, some aspects which are still difficult to reconcile. One is the intention to go on with the production of some new nuclear armaments - such as the B-2 bomber. Another is the question of the Strategic Defense Initiative programme. Another example is the asymmetry in the proposed reductions of land-based MIRVs, on the one hand, and the sea-launched ones, on the other. Moreover, some observers have pointed out that, if the rationale for eliminating certain nuclear weapons is the diminution of the Soviet threat, why not reduce radically the rest of the nuclear weapons, beginning with the strategic ones? Others have noted that the proposals could be in part the result of a decision merely to rearrange the various components of the nuclear arsenals in the light of the concern regarding the danger that would entail the horizontal proliferation in Central Europe, and even within the Soviet Union itself, of certain types of nuclear weapons, especially tactical ones.

What is important, however, is that the initiative could set in motion the process of dismantling nuclear-weapon systems. And that process could lead very soon - and we hope it will - to further measures aimed at ending the

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actual production of nuclear weapons and all tests. We urge the United States and the Soviet Union to intensify their bilateral consultations on this question and we urge the other nuclear-weapon States to follow their example.

All of this should serve to spur the work of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on three priority items of its agenda, all of them relating to nuclear disarmament. We also hope that it will have a positive effect on the efforts which, under the guidance of Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia, are being carried out in order to amend the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Amendment Conference began its work in New York last January and decided to request its President to conduct a series of consultations with the aim of furthering the consideration of various aspects relating to a comprehensive test ban, in particular with regard to the verification of compliance and possible sanctions in case of non-compliance. We hope that the Conference will continue its work in 1992 and that, pending a comprehensive test ban, all nuclear-weapon States will suspend their tests through unilateral or agreed moratoriums. In this regard, the recent announcement by the Soviet Union is especially heartening.

In conclusion, I should like to say that on 14 February 1992, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, will mark its silver anniversary. Once again we call on France to ratify its Additional Protocol I, and on the countries of the region that are not yet parties to the Treaty to adhere to it. That will be proof that all countries, all of us, are ready to strengthen the international instruments regarding nuclear disarmament. All of us should also take

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advantage of the present international situation in order to move decisively towards a world free from nuclear weapons.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Sir, on behalf of the European Community and its member States, I wish to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of the First Committee of the General Assembly. I should also like to extend my best wishes and congratulations to the other officers of the Committee. I am sure that under your able leadership the First Committee can look forward to a fruitful session. Let me assure you of the wholehearted support of the European Community and its member States in the accomplishment of the important task with which you have been entrusted.

Our work in the First Committee of the General Assembly comes at an important time in the field of international peace and security. Many new developments have taken place since our last session, and more will undoubtedly be forthcoming in the near future. While the spectacular decline of East-West tensions has been clearing the way for new, cooperative security structures, some long-standing concerns as well as new challenges remind us of the amount of work that remains on our agenda.

Looking at the vastly changed international security environment, the recent war in the Gulf and its aftermath cannot but figure prominently in our minds. The Twelve pay a tribute to the resolute collective efforts which have led to the restoration of Kuwait's sovereign independence and have thus demonstrated that aggression does not pay and can be reversed. Beyond its immediate effects, the Gulf conflict has illustrated the effectiveness of a truly collective security system which the United Nations has been expounding down the years. The breakdown of the paralysing division of much of the world into two antagonistic camps was a major factor enabling the Security Council

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to assert the authority vested in it by the United Nations Charter and thus to respond to the challenge posed by the invasion of Kuwait. The Twelve warmly welcome the increased weight of the United Nations in matters of international peace and security as a result of the Gulf conflict. They believe that there is now a need and opportunities for a more active and assertive role for the United Nations in international peace and security. One such opportunity may be the expansion of the United Nations role in disarmament and arms control, where the Twelve will lend their support to the United Nations efforts to build upon the momentum which has now been generated.

The experience of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in implementing Security Council resolution 687 (1991) holds important lessons for the implementation of arms control agreements. By ordering the mandatory elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, the United Nations has broken new ground. The Twelve wish to emphasize that the Special Commission deserves every measure of support, as does the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in fulfilment of resolution 687 (1991).

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The pioneering work of the Special Commission and the IAEA in Iraq underscores the urgency of curbing at the global level the rising tide of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of missiles. If we are to eradicate the proliferation threat, we must resolve its underlying causes. I refer of course to the many political divisions, both old and new, which continue to burden the reality of international relations. At the same time, the Twelve attach the utmost importance to the early establishment of a system of effective and interlocking arms control and disarmament measures designed to root out the threat that proliferation poses to global security. In the view of the Twelve, these disarmament measures must be complemented by new action to prevent the build-up of conventional-weapon arsenals well beyond the levels warranted by the legitimate right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter.

Having dwelt on the Gulf war and its impact on the international security environment, I should like to review briefly the recent progress made in the field of arms control and disarmament. The European Community and its member States welcome the new climate of confidence prevailing in Europe, which has already benefited our work during the last two sessions of the First Committee. The revolutionary political changes in Central and Eastern Europe, now leading to the gradual consolidation of free and democratic societies in that part of the world, have imparted a new quality to security relations on the European continent.

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), concluded in November last year, will be a cornerstone of future European security. The reduction in conventional forces and the far-reaching verification regime provided for in the Treaty reflect the desire on the part of the contracting parties for a

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significantly greater degree of political and military stability and cooperation in Europe. The solution of the problems that had arisen concerning the CFE Treaty can now lead to its early ratification and entry into force.

The Twelve welcome the significant progress made in the field of confidence- and security-building measures, as reflected in the Vienna document. The new instrument of evaluation of information on military forces and on plans for the deployment of major weapon and equipment systems by visits which must be announced five days in advance became effective on 1 July 1991. The first evaluation visits have taken place over the past few months and have clearly indicated that these visits are a valuable tool in promoting confidence among participating States.

The ongoing negotiations on manpower levels in Europe as well as the continuing negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures represent a further step towards strengthening stability and security within our continent. The Twelve wish to emphasize that the further development of a security dialogue and of arms-control measures will be embedded in the wider framework of the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In this respect the CSCE participating States have recently started informal preparatory consultations aimed at initiating new negotiations in 1992, after the conclusion of the Helsinki follow-up meeting.

The Twelve welcome the encouraging outcome of the recent exploratory round on an open skies agreement, to which they attach the utmost priority. As an open skies regime will introduce a new dimension of transparency and confidence-building and will further advance the arms control process, the Twelve are in principle in favour of full participation by all CSCE

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participating States that might wish to join the negotiations. The Twelve express the hope that rapid progress will be made towards the earliest possible establishment of an open skies regime.

The European Community and its member States wish to emphasize that the further development of this new European security order must remain firmly embedded in the wider framework of the CSCE process that, now more than ever before, represents an important factor of stability in the face of changes between and within the nations of Europe which at times entail conflict.

Recent events in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union are dramatic testimony to the many unresolved and historically rooted sources of conflict that now demand our urgent attention. It cannot be stressed enough that structural solutions conducive to the creation of new and stable constitutional orders in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, including full respect for human rights and democratic freedoms, can be found only through negotiations and dialogue.

There have been dramatic initiatives in nuclear-arms control since the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Twelve none the less warmly welcome that Treaty and look forward to its early ratification. The START Treaty, leading to increased stability through substantial reductions in the most destabilizing strategic nuclear arms in particular, is a milestone in the nuclear-arms-control process and the basis for further measures outlined recently by the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the view of the Twelve, nuclear disarmament must be supported and strengthened by an effective international nuclear-non-proliferation regime. The recent accessions of more States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and more specifically the prospect of accession to the Treaty

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by all five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, will buttress the existing nuclear-non-proliferation regime.

In the field of conventional-arms control further measures must be given our increasing attention. This is an area where all States can make a significant contribution to the ultimate goal of global arms control and disarmament. The recent Gulf war has sharply reminded us of the grave dangers that the excessive build-up of conventional arsenals poses to international peace and security. The Twelve are ready to start tackling this problem during the present session of the First Committee.

To complete this brief review of the main outstanding issues on our agenda, we welcome the ongoing negotiating efforts in Geneva to overcome the remaining obstacles in the way of a global, effectively verifiable and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.

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Similarly, the recent Third Review Conference of the parties to the biological and toxin weapons Convention has just outlined a programme of action designed to uphold, and where possible strengthen, the existing ban on biological weapons.

Nuclear disarmament continues to be one of the Twelve's highest priorities in the field of arms control and disarmament. The Twelve consider that making further progress in nuclear-arms control remains one of the most serious challenges facing the world today. They therefore note with satisfaction that the process leading to genuine arms reductions, which the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF Treaty) inaugurated, has visibly accelerated now that President Bush and President Gorbachev have appended their signatures to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). By agreeing for the first time actually to reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union have demonstrated their special responsibility in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament. The Twelve warmly welcome the Treaty as an important milestone along the road to substantial and balanced nuclear arms reductions, a process to which they continue to attach the utmost importance.

The Twelve therefore strongly support the initiative of the United States concerning the unilateral reduction of its nuclear arsenal, as announced by President Bush on 27 September. The implementation of this initiative will result in a substantial reduction of the nuclear arsenal. The Twelve hope that this initiative will be conducive to further far-reaching steps in order to bring about greater stability at substantially lower levels. The Twelve welcome with pleasure the positive response of the Soviet Union announcing its intention also to reduce its nuclear stockpile. They look forward with

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confidence to the outcome of the forthcoming consultations on these matters, including strategic defences. The Twelve strongly support early follow-on talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues, as well as the continuation without delay of negotiations on defence and space issues, including the relationship between means of strategic offence and defence.

With the removal of the last intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe, the Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces, which eliminates a whole class of nuclear weapons, has been successfully implemented. Mindful of the improved political and military conditions prevailing on the European continent, the Twelve welcome the prospect of far-reaching reductions by the United States and the Soviet Union in short-range nuclear arms.

We cannot, however, close our eyes to some less encouraging developments. The European Community and its Member States are gravely concerned about reports from the Special Commission set up under Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Security Council that the Government of Iraq so blatantly violated its obligations under the safeguards agreement pursuant to the non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and resolution 687 (1991).

The Twelve reaffirm their commitment to the principle of nuclear non-proliferation in general, and the NPT in particular, as a cornerstone of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation. They welcome the accession of more States to the NPT. In this respect they commend Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe for having recently become parties. With the announced intended accessions of France and China, all the permanent members of the Security Council will have underwritten the NPT, thus further strengthening the Treaty's universality. The Twelve are confident

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that, in parallel with wider adherence to the NPT, a better functioning of the present nuclear non-proliferation regime can be brought about. Thus, in view of recent events, we look forward to a reinforcement of the various elements of that regime and, in particular, to a further strengthening and improvement of safeguards implementation. We expect that discussions being held at present within IAEA will soon reach positive conclusions to this end.

A conference to amend the partial test-ban Treaty was held in New York in January of this year. No consensus was reached, a fact which reflects the diverging views on the degree of priority to be given to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. There exists, nevertheless, a clear trend towards limiting nuclear testing, as exemplified by a decreasing number of actual explosions and by the Protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in June 1990, and ratified by both countries. The prospects for further limitations, as foreseen by the United States and the Soviet Union, should be discussed bilaterally.

The Twelve note the re-establishment this year by the Conference on Disarmament of its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. They believe that the issue of nuclear testing should continue to be addressed in that multilateral context.

Before turning to global disarmament issues proper, I would like to signal the increasing importance of the institutional aspects of the arms-control and disarmament process. As our agendas and our forums grow in size, so does the centrality of multilateral disarmament diplomacy. In this connection, the Twelve wish to stress the unique character of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating

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forum within the United Nations system. We welcome the growing number of States which, although not members of the Conference, are participating in its work. We trust that the new working methods and additional improvements in the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament will further enhance the important role which it already plays within the global arms control and disarmament process.

The Gulf war has imparted a new sense of urgency to reaching the long-sought goal of a global, effectively verifiable and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. After many years of multilateral negotiations in the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the speedy conclusion of a chemical weapons convention has clearly become imperative. Much of the groundwork has already been done. The favourable outcome of the Gulf war now provides the negotiators with a political window of opportunity, which we cannot afford to ignore. With determination and imagination we can bring the negotiations to their final and decisive phase.

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In this connection, the Twelve warmly welcome the timely and substantial revision of the positions of the United States, as set out by President Bush's initiative, which should facilitate the completion of the negotiations by the middle of 1992. In view of the amount of progress already made in Geneva, this timetable seems by all means achievable. The Twelve welcome President Bush's important announcement that the United States formally forswears the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation, against any State and unconditionally commits itself to the destruction of all its stocks within 10 years after the entry into force of the convention. This should clear the way for the resolution of the remaining issues, among which verification stands out. Confidence in compliance is the crucial yardstick by which the credibility of the future chemical weapons convention will be measured. The Twelve therefore call on all negotiating parties to muster the creativity and political will necessary to break the deadlock over this seemingly intractable issue. They are confident that this and other remaining obstacles can be overcome during the next few months, and they reaffirm their intention to be among the first signatories of the convention. The Twelve invite other States to do likewise, either on a national or on a regional basis. No efforts should be spared to help deliver the promise of a chemical weapons convention, including the full and timely implementation of last year's breakthrough agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the destruction of their respective chemical weapons stockpiles.

While a global, effectively verifiable and comprehensive chemical weapons convention is the ultimate response to the scourge of chemical warfare, the ongoing diversion from their legitimate uses of materials and technology needed for the manufacture of chemical weapons requires immediate and decisive

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action, at both the national and the international level. In conjunction with other States, the Twelve are working to strengthen and expand existing arrangements aimed at preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Halting the spread of chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is a practical objective for the period following the Gulf war, and this should be initiated in Iraq. The European Community and its member States wish to stress that Iraq must fully abide by the relevant terms of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) concerning the elimination of its nuclear, chemical and biological warfare and missile capabilities.

Last but not least, the Twelve recall the importance of upholding the authority given to the Secretary-General to investigate cases of alleged use of chemical weapons.

On several occasions during the past years the Twelve have warned against the proliferation of biological weapons. The first biological weapons inspection carried out by the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq has shown that our concerns were justified. Unlike the case of chemical weapons, the international instrument banning biological and toxin weapons already exists. I am referring to the biological and toxin weapons Convention of 1972. The Twelve consider the strengthening of this Convention to be of the utmost importance.

The Twelve therefore welcome the outcome of the Third Review Conference of States Parties to this Convention, which took place in Geneva from 9 to 27 September 1991. Significant progress was made, inter alia, in the field of confidence-building measures. In this regard, the Twelve call on all States parties to participate in the improved and expanded confidence-building measures that were agreed upon.

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The Twelve particularly welcome the important decision of the Conference to establish an ad hoc group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint. The Twelve stress the importance of the recognition by the Conference that effective verification could reinforce the Convention. They consider highly encouraging the great interest in verification expressed by a considerable number of delegations present at the Conference. This corresponds at the same time to a growing awareness by the international community of the risks of proliferation and to progress in openness to multilateral controls. The Twelve hope that this interest will be reflected in a broad participation in the work of the expert group. They are of the opinion that the proceedings of the Third Review Conference and the Final Declaration adopted by the Conference have underlined the importance of this international instrument as the authoritative norm against biological and toxin weapons, a norm which fully deserves our support, now and in the future. The Twelve sincerely hope that States which are not yet parties to the Convention will be encouraged by the decisions of the Review Conference to accede to the Convention without delay.

The European Community and its member States reaffirm the importance they attach to regional arms control and disarmament measures. Arms control and disarmament achievements on a regional level will, alongside bilateral and multilateral negotiations, facilitate global arms control and disarmament efforts. While initiatives in this field should take into account the specific characteristics of each region, some general principles can be drawn from the experience gathered so far. The successful conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in November of last year and the

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simultaneous adoption of a substantial new set of confidence- and security-building measures by the participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) deserve mention in this context. One of our partners has taken an initiative aimed at regional disarmament in a Balkan area.

As the European experience suggests, such confidence-building measures as the exchange of information on military structures and force deployments, the advance notification of large-scale military movements, the mandatory invitation of observers and on-site inspections, will lead to greater openness, transparency and predictability of military activities.

Secondly, regional arms control and disarmament measures should focus, initially and as a matter of priority, on the most destabilizing military capabilities and imbalances, such as the capacity to launch surprise attacks and to conduct large-scale offensive operations.

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Thirdly, the process of adoption by all countries of defensive force structures should result in a stable military balance at the lowest possible level of armed forces and armaments and in conditions of equal and undiminished security for all participants.

Fourthly, regional arms control and disarmament measures must be buttressed by adequate verification provisions. Last but not least, arms control and disarmament measures in one region should not lead to increased arms transfers to other regions.

While measures such as those I have just outlined should come from and be developed by the region itself, initiatives from outside can be called for to act as a catalyst. This is certainly the case with respect to the Middle East, where regional arms-control and disarmament measures must be instituted as a matter of priority. In this connection, the European Community and its member States give their unequivocal support to the objective of instituting arms limitation and disarmament arrangements in the Middle East, including the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and the possible consideration of measures for conventional-arms reductions. They recall the various proposals to this end put forward by President Mubarak, and welcome the timely arms-control initiative which President Bush proposed for that region, as well as the global disarmament initiative presented by President Mitterrand and the related proposal on conventional arms made by Prime Minister Major. The Twelve call on all States in the region to join the international efforts now under way aimed at ridding the Middle East of the scourge of war.

Now that the world has irreversibly moved beyond the East-West divide and its attendant arms race into an era of greater international cooperation, the

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excessive levels of conventional armaments held by many States stand out as a dangerous anomaly. The Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf war exemplify the permanent threat which the indiscriminate acquisition of massive arsenals by certain States poses to regional peace and stability and, indeed, to international security as a whole. If it is to prevent the repetition of tragedies similar to the one which afflicted the Gulf, the international community must develop ways to deny States the instruments which enable them to sow war and devastation. Missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction are a particularly notorious example in this respect, which is why the Twelve reaffirm their support for the guidelines of the missile technology control regime.

We are aware of the conceptual and practical difficulties which greater control over the burgeoning international arms trade entails. The Twelve acknowledge the right to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and accept that to be able to exercise that right many States depend on arms imports. But while every State should enjoy the means to ensure its security in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Charter, its armaments holdings should not exceed its legitimate self-defence needs to the point of becoming a threat in themselves to neighbouring countries. Achieving wide acceptance of this concept of reasonable sufficiency is one of the many practical challenges we face in the post-Gulf-war period.

Since in this field no international agreements are in place or in the process of negotiation, we shall have to innovate and break new ground where necessary. The European Community and its member States, for their part, are determined to come to grips with this problem and to contribute to its

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resolution, as they made clear in the Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports issued by the European Council at its most recent meeting, in Luxembourg in June.

In the perspective of political union and in the framework of their internal consultations, the Twelve wish to elaborate on the basis of a common set of criteria a common approach to the harmonization of their internal policies. At the international level, the Twelve believe that far-reaching action is needed immediately to promote restraint and transparency in the transfers of conventional weapons and of technologies for military use, in particular towards areas of tension.

First and foremost, the Twelve stress that openness and transparency, which by now are well-established principles of arms control and confidence building, must be extended to the international trade in conventional arms and military technology. Several initiatives are already being taken in this respect.

At the regional level proposals are being considered in the context of the negotiations in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on confidence- and security-building measures for the annual exchange of information on production and exports of military equipment.

At the global level the Twelve are giving the greatest priority to the early establishment of a universal and non-discriminatory United Nations register of conventional arms transfers. They note with appreciation that this initiative has already attracted wide support from recipient and supplier countries, including the seven most industrialised countries and the five permanent members of the Security Council. In this context, they welcome the

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stated readiness of those States, which account for the overwhelming bulk of conventional arms transfers, to start tackling this worrying problem.

The timely and excellent report by the Group of Governmental Experts on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms, established under the aegis of the United Nations Secretary-General, gives added weight to the proposal for a register. In our view, such a register would promote several objectives: it responds to the need for greater openness and transparency; it could give early warning of attempted arms build-ups beyond the level of reasonable sufficiency. Finally, the establishment of a register would constitute a first practical step in a wider process designed to curb irresponsible and destabilizing arms transfers.

The Twelve are therefore among the original sponsors of a draft resolution on the establishment of a register which will be submitted during the present session of the First Committee. As to the practical modalities of the register, the Twelve will aim for a system that is unambiguous, easy to administer and ready for immediate adoption. Later, improvements can of course be envisaged in the light of the experience gained. We trust that these various elements will commend themselves to the First Committee, and we solicit the cooperation and support of all States in achieving substantive results in this field.

In addition to the establishment of a universal register of arms transfers, the Twelve call on suppliers as well as recipients of conventional arms to observe responsibility and restraint in an area where restraint has on some occasions been so manifestly absent, to the detriment of regional and global security.

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Restraint is particularly called for where destabilizing weapons, such as ballistic missiles, are concerned. This in itself already can contribute to a more reasonable pattern of arms tranfers. The provisions in the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) which aim at preventing the transfer of surplus weaponry to countries outside the area covered by the Treaty are a commendable development in this context.

Third, the Twelve would welcome a dialogue between recipient and supplier countries, with a view to evolving an agreed code of conduct governing arms transfers. We remain open to the further consideration of the arms-trade issue in all its aspects by the United Nations and other appropriate multilateral forums.

The transparency of international arms transfers is just one aspect, albeit an important one, of greater openness in, and objective information on, military matters in general. The Twelve have consistently spoken out in favour of such openness, which they see as a means to strengthen mutual confidence and overall security. The Twelve will therefore continue to support the annual reporting of military budgets and call for wider participation in this exercise.

The growing importance of objective information on military matters was well reflected in this year's session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), as next year's report will undoubtedly show. In this context the Twelve note with appreciation the renewed sense of purpose which the implementation of UNDC reform has imparted to the Commission's deliberations this year.

More generally, the vigorous activities undertaken by the United Nations disarmament machinery, especially in the field of verification, testify to the

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present vitality of the arms-control and disarmament process. The Twelve commend the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) for its dynamic efforts aimed at promoting the multilateral dimensions of the arms-control and disarmament process. Similarly, the various research papers published by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) during the ten years of its existence, as well as the useful activities undertaken by the United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and Disarmament, have given greater visibility to the United Nations role in arms control and disarmament.

In the wake of recent arms-control and disarmament achievements, significant reductions in military expenditures can be observed in many States. While such reductions will undoubtedly be beneficial in the longer term, they can entail painful economic adjustments in the short term. The European Community and its Member States acknowledge that the transition from military-dominated to civilian economies has become a dominant concern in a growing number of States.

There is, however, no single blueprint for the conversion of defence resources into civilian industries. Differences between the existing economic and political systems impose limits on the possibility of evolving a general approach to the conversion issue. In our view, the conversion process can therefore best be managed along balanced and pragmatic lines in accordance with the specific conditions prevailing in each country. Thus, in a free-market economy, conversion will essentially take the form of a natural economic response to the problem of adjusting supply to changing demands in the civilian industry. Technical and economic feasibility, rather than political desirability, will then be the key factors determining the scope and the pace of the conversion process.

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This also means that we cannot see conversion as a prerequisite for developing international peace and security. At the same time the Twelve feel that governments should avail themselves of existing collaborative structures, both at the national and international level, which could assist national conversion processes.

Now is the time to preserve and build upon the spirit of international cooperation which we have been able to establish. As I said before, we cannot afford to let precious opportunities slip away, and least so in the area of arms control and disarmament which, as we all know, is so susceptible to the cross-currents of international relations.

The Twelve trust that the First Committee will fully play its part in the quest for cooperative solutions to our common security challenges. In recent years the First Committee has demonstrated its growing ability to put effectiveness before rhetoric and flexibility before dogmatism. Further rationalization of its procedures and streamlining of its agenda should enable our Committee to deal decisively with the real problems of today.

As in previous years, the European Community and its member States will again promote wider consensus on a well-contained overall number of resolutions. In a continued effort towards setting priorities, the Twelve will also encourage a more frequent biannualization or multiannualization of items on our agenda. They appeal to other States to join in these practical efforts aimed at maximizing the contribution of the First Committee to the cause of disarmament.

Mr. SOMAVIA (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the Chilean delegation, allow me to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. We know that your diplomatic abilities will have a

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decisive impact on the attainment of positive results at this session. In addition, as a Chilean, I take special satisfaction in seeing a former activist of the historic Solidarity Union leading us in our endeavours. You are a living symbol of recent world-wide changes.

I should also like to congratulate the Vice-Chairman, from Turkey, Ambassador Ordoñez of the Philippines and our very good friend and colleague Mr. Pablo Sader, who represents Latin America at the table. I also congratulate our dear friend Mr. Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, because during this year of great change he has carried on with great vision, great energy and sensitivity in promoting reflection on complex matters, which is one of the main tasks of the United Nations; and finally Ambassador Komatina for his work as Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, which at this moment in international relations will perhaps move ahead on subjects that have been, up to now, limited.

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Finally, although we have already heard the tributes to Ambassador Garcia Robles, I cannot fail to add a brief personal note. Let me refer to a different kind of solidarity and emphasize his ongoing solidarity with the struggle of the Chilean people to restore their democracy. This adds a new dimension to those with which all members of the Committee are familiar, and reflects in him a solidarity of which I personally became aware during a period of political exile in Mexico. He was a symbol of great universal values - not only in disarmament spheres.

This session begins with good news in the field of disarmament: we are witnessing the first practical results of the end of the cold war and of the uncompromising ideological confrontation that brought mankind so much suffering. We welcome the decisions of the United States and the Soviet Union on the reduction and elimination of short-range nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles and the moratoriums on nuclear tests. We welcome, too, the significant reductions that have been announced in overall defence expenditure for coming years.

However, in the new era on which we are embarking it would have been more meaningful had some of these decisions been announced for the first time in the United Nations. Such a gesture would have strengthened the Organization and given a symbolic indication that in the sphere of disarmament the United Nations is able to play a more relevant role.

Unfortunately, we note that the major Powers still retain attitudes which hinder multilateral forums from completely fulfilling the tasks for which they were created, namely, the General Assembly, as the highest forum of dialogue and political guidance of the international community as a whole; the Disarmament Commission, as the principal technical forum with a broad

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representation of countries; and the Conference on Disarmament, as the negotiating organ, albeit restricted in its membership.

In this regard, I appeal to the General Assembly at this session to urge the members of the Conference on Disarmament to complete during 1992 consultations on its expansion and to decide on the applications submitted by a number of countries, including Chile, to become members of that organ.

We must reiterate our concern over the lack of agreement within the Conference on Disarmament on matters as sensitive as nuclear disarmament and the increasing detriment to the ecological balance. Since there is also no negotiating mandate in the respective committees, we cannot but criticize the lack of political will to achieve substantive progress in the multilateral disarmament sphere. None the less, we consider initiatives such as the treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear testing submitted by Sweden as positive steps, and we shall look into them thoroughly.

The draft resolutions adopted yearly by the First Committee should evolve towards more legally binding instruments that strengthen international peace and security. Aware of this vexing situation, my Government, together with those of Argentina and Brazil, at the beginning of last month signed the Mendoza Accord on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Weapons, an instrument to which Uruguay has now subscribed and which is open to participation by the other Latin American countries.

This regional confidence-building measure, which confirms previous unilateral declarations on the non-possession of biological and chemical weapons, contains mechanisms which are contemplated in the future convention on chemical weapons being negotiated by the Conference on Disarmament and which promote that Convention's prompt conclusion and entry into force.

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Similarly, President Aylwin, aware of the importance of giving full effect to the Ttatelolco Treaty, has taken the necessary steps, together with other Latin American countries in the same situation as Chile, to negotiate the implementation in practice of the provisions of that fundamental disarmament instrument.

Chile does not want nuclear weapons in the region, either its own or those of others. They are not needed; on the contrary, they constitute a source of mistrust and their mere existence produces friction and gives rise to political and environmental risks. The time has come when we must begin to think about the international legality of nuclear weapons. To what extent is their mere existence, rather than a source of collective security, actually a potential crime against mankind? Is there any real difference, from an ethical standpoint, between the massive suffering and devastation wrought by chemical weapons that we are prepared to ban and that resulting from nuclear weapons? From the legal and humanitarian viewpoint the reasons for banning the former are as valid as the reasons for banning the latter.

The various initiatives aimed at establishing a register of conventional weapons by the United Nations deserves our support, so much so that my country, at the last meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS), together with Argentina, Brazil and Canada, sponsored an analogous proposal of regional scope. However, we must emphasize that Chile and other Latin American countries have comments with respect to these proposals. They relate to the compulsory nature sought to be given to the registry, the failure to include certain aspects such as internal production of weapons and their control and the problem of illicit arms-trafficking. In addition, we must

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ensure that the register be universal, non-discriminatory and respectful of the principle of self-defence.

Moreover, my Government believes that, while the initiative is perhaps one of the most relevant we have seen in the First Committee in recent times, it constitutes but one step further in the disarmament process, which needs to be complemented with comprehensive measures on the elimination of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

The Government of Chile notes with dismay that an essentially political topic, such as that of enhancing the idea of security by way of non-military elements - one so often raised by Chile in various forums of the United Nations - is not gaining acceptance in the work of the First Committee. These new components of the concept of security - which encompass not only the military aspects of disarmament, but all present or future threats which may erode local, regional or world stability, economic development and human dignity - call for emphasis to be placed on negotiations aimed at establishing an appropriate relationship between disarmament and development, thereby enabling us effectively to release for economic and social development funds earmarked for the purchase of weapons that do not play a deterrent role and that cannot be justified for purposes of legitimate self-defence.

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Of particular relevance in this regard is the Stockholm Declaration of 22 April 1991. That Declaration, which was signed by my Government, refers to the peace dividend - a much-discussed but very elusive concept. The Declaration mentions the use of funds saved as a result of economies in the acquisition of weapons for purposes of international cooperation and for the creation of a global emergency system for conflict prevention. These are initiatives that my Government fully supports.

However, we are well aware of the great difficulties that are beginning to emerge in the process of turning the much discussed peace dividend into a material and financial reality. Budget deficit and balance-of-payment problems are mentioned, together with domestic needs, the cost of the destruction of weapons and of industrial conversion, the lack of economic growth and access to markets. These and many other emerging problems are cited to explain the fact that, once again, the needs of developing countries remain unsatisfied. This reminds us of the ease and speed with which nearly $45 billion were raised for the purpose of prosecuting the Gulf war. It reminds us also of the impossibility of creative, innovative and resolute action in the sphere of financing development.

This leads me to think that, in the final analysis, the real peace dividend is not just a matter related to the use of resources released from military budgets, important though that may be. The real peace dividend is a political, intellectual and cultural one. The main benefit should be our own capacity to think with open minds, and on the basis of up-to-date criteria, about the problems of peace and security. We must begin by recognizing that the ideological division of the world eclipsed other security problems at least as important as the confrontation between the super-Powers. But, in

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addition, the cold war intellectually distorted our identification of the problems by defining them in terms of a friend-enemy dichotomy rather than in terms of permanent values. A major example of this dichotomy is the way in which concepts as profound as human rights and democracy have been manipulated. The cold war was a source of deep personal and family insecurity for millions of people throughout the world - not primarily because of fear of a nuclear holocaust but, rather, because the struggle for human rights and democracy was a subordinate political factor. It was always secondary to the overriding objective of defeating the other super-Power and its allies. In the name of the fight for freedom, dictatorships of all kinds were promoted, protected and assisted. From an ethical and moral point of view, it is a sad story.

This lesson of the recent past makes us realize the need to ask ourselves how, today, we want to identify and define the problems of security in the post-cold war world. As I have said in various United Nations forums, the Government of Chile believes that we must ponder the main sources of contemporary insecurity and what might be the most appropriate instruments to deal with them. To that end, I should like to share a few thoughts with other members of the Committee.

First, since the end of the Second World War the State has been at the centre of our attention with regard to security. Thus, we have neglected the personal and social problems of the individual. Today, we must acknowledge that the security of the individual is at least as important as the security of the State and, above all, that one cannot be achieved at the expense of the other.

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Secondly, in the contemporary world the main sources of insecurity for the individual citizen are economic, social and environmental. Social insecurity is caused by poverty, unemployment, criminal and political violence, drugs, population growth and environmental deterioration, among other things. This is especially so in the case of the countries of the third world, and it should be noted that insecurity from this source can be fought not with weapons but only with political and social instruments and by various means of international cooperation.

Thirdly, we must assume that, with the end of the cold war, security will increasingly become a matter of interdependence. There will be no security in the North unless there is security in the South; there will be no security for those who enjoy well-being unless we can devise solutions to the problems of those who live in a state of social uncertainty. Neither societies nor the world will be stable unless we diminish simultaneously the various sources of insecurity in all countries.

Fourthly, as we all know, the receding danger of global conflict, as well as political movements towards democracy and the market, are creating new points of tension or have activated some latent ones. Regional situations will be more at the focus of international debate. This will create new responsibilities for the countries of a region - for instance, in the case of Haiti, responsibilities for Latin America and the Caribbean, where the Organization of American States has acted decisively and firmly to demand the restoration of the legitimate Government.

But these new situations that we are living through also enable us to take a fresh look at concepts that, in the context of the cold war, were given ideological interpretations favourable to one side or the other. I refer, for

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example, to the concept of a zone of peace. It is clear that this could be of major usefulness in the regional setting. Latin America and the Caribbean are moving in that direction. Years ago Brazil had the vision to propose the establishment of a zone of peace for the Atlantic, and that was approved by the General Assembly. A similar suggestion was made by Peru in respect of the Pacific; the Central American Governments are discussing the creation of a zone of peace in Central America; and President Borja of Ecuador recently proposed to the General Assembly the creation of a South American zone of peace.

All of this forms part of a new dynamic process of enriching some concepts and of rehabilitating others that were discarded as a result of the mechanical workings of the cold war and the ideological simplification that it meant for mankind. For instance, along these lines, it is possible, following the good example of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to consider the convening of regional or subregional conferences that would gradually address situations in the framework of these new realities.

(Mr. [illegible], Chile)

As I have already indicated, it is an obvious fact that the problems of drugs, the environment and other such matters are also problems of security, but they are not the same kind of security problems as those that are discussed in the Security Council or even here in the First Committee. We are beginning to identify such security problems which, as has been said before, according to the modern view of the concept, point to the need to pay attention to the economic, social and environmental dimensions of the problems, dimensions which are dealt with in the Second and Third Committees of the General Assembly.

The interrelationship of disarmament and international security is clearer today than ever before. We cannot neglect the causes of insecurity that affect human beings, families, communities, States and mankind as a whole. The emergence of a new international order requires that attention be given to the legitimate aspirations of all the members of the world. Disarmament must be a global process which, taking into account the specific characteristics of each region, will help to improve the living conditions of the developing countries.

The United Nations is the appropriate forum for the realization of a shared vision of what security should be in the decade of the 1990s. Let us not waste that opportunity, perhaps a unique opportunity in history, to achieve substantial advances in the development of ideas and of political practice to promote international peace and security.

Mr. ZLENKO (Ukraine) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to express my satisfaction at seeing you, a representative of a country that is Ukraine's friendly neighbour, presiding over the deliberations of the First Committee. I wish you and all the officers of the Committee every success in accomplishing the Committee's tasks at the forty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

The turbulent developments of the past few years have dramatically changed the global political landscape. Structures of a new world order are taking shape on the basis of cooperation, interaction and trust. The Paris Charter for a New Europe, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the signing of the Soviet-United States Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the recent half United States and Soviet initiatives in nuclear disarmament all these measures are creating the foundation of a fundamentally new security system based on mutually beneficial cooperation and interaction. In other words, the world has become a much safer place to live. But the threat of a major conflict has not vanished from the political horizon.

The indivisible and integral nature of security is being made obvious through the intrinsic links between its military, political, environmental, economic and humanitarian dimensions. Yet the ending of military confrontation and the reductions in military capabilities, primarily through disarmament and arms control but also by downscaling and limiting military activities, remain central to any multidimensional concept of security. This process should undoubtedly be well-balanced and continuous and should extend to all nations and cover all types of arms. In this respect, every nation must shoulder its share of responsibility for the situation in the world, while the United Nations should assess every action in its duty. Among the

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military aspects of security, nuclear arms and consequently nuclear disarmament are the fundamental issues in today's world.

Ukraine has consistently advocated the elimination of all nuclear arsenals. We are convinced that an effective, balanced and efficient international security system could prevent or, if necessary, curb any aggression through a joint international effort not involving the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

On 24 August this year, the Parliament of Ukraine proclaimed Ukrainian State independence, and implementation arrangements followed immediately. Currently, we are awaiting the endorsement of that decision in a referendum on 1 December this year.

The Parliament of the Republic has decreed that all armed forces within the territory of Ukraine fall under its jurisdiction. This has led to some concern in certain public quarters and official circles in many countries that Ukrainian independence might lead to the emergence of a new nuclear Power. Please rest assured that that concern is groundless. On the contrary, I am convinced that Ukraine's consistent policy in favour of eliminating nuclear weapons has been instrumental in the far-reaching, coordinated nuclear disarmament measures announced by President Bush and President Gorbachev, and that that policy will be helpful in the implementation of those measures.

Our position means that all nuclear arms on our territory should be eliminated as soon as possible. I should like to quote what was said by Leonid Kravchuk, President of the Supreme Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament, in his statement on 30 September in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly:

[illegible]

[illegible]

"Ukraine does not seek to possess nuclear weapons. It intends to become a party to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear State. This intention is in line with international efforts to reduce and destroy nuclear stockpiles throughout the world. By adopting this stand, Ukraine wishes to promote disarmament and greater trust among nations." (A/46/PV.14, p. 27)

"As the Assembly knows, certain nuclear-weapon systems are at present deployed in Ukrainian territory. Our policy is that these nuclear weapons are only temporarily stationed in Ukraine. Eliminating them and the components of their deployment is just a matter of time." (Ibid.)

Of course, Ukraine is not the only nation in the world to have opted for a non-nuclear status. But it is one thing to refrain from acquiring one's own arms, and it is quite another to make one's choice in favour of a non-nuclear future when one has to face the costs of eliminating hundreds of strategic and tactical weapons and their production and maintenance facilities.

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Considering the vivid example of some super-Powers, a few Ukrainian politicians would sometimes argue: Why hurry, if other nuclear Powers have rejected the non-nuclear option while actively encouraging others to accept it? Why do we not do the same? Indeed, people are right when they say that nothing is as seductive as a bad example, but it is even more true that most people have enough common sense and moral strength not to be led astray by questionable precedents. This we feel warrants an optimistic perception of human progress.

It is international partnership on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and not the possession of nuclear arms that will guarantee the future of the world community. We sincerely hope that Ukraine's non-nuclear option will be judged on its merits as a meaningful contribution to consolidating international security and strengthening the non-proliferation Treaty, which should be made a treaty of unlimited duration.

At this point I shall quote again from the statement made by the President of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine:

> "The world community must not let the new opportunities presented today pass by. The non-proliferation of nuclear arms, other weapons of mass destruction and combat missiles and missile technology has become particularly relevant. Ukraine welcomes the declarations by France, China and South Africa of their decision to adhere to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. A situation is developing in which any State's intention not to adhere to the Treaty may be regarded as contrary to the common interests of mankind". (A/46/PV.14, p. 26)

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A frequent question raised in the context of recent events, including developments in Ukraine, is whether the nuclear forces are in fact adequately protected from accidental or unauthorized use. We have a very clear policy with regard to these weapons in Ukrainian territory: command and control of nuclear arms, as long as they still exist, must preclude any possibility of unauthorized use. But, of course, a second question quite naturally arises: Is it really conceivable, or morally admissible, or indeed reasonable to envisage any kind of authorized use of nuclear systems of mass destruction?

The world can live and must live without mass annihilation weapons. But so long as they are still there, there can be only one conceivable way to use them in an "authorized" manner - namely, as a nuclear response to a nuclear attack. Anything else defies all perceptions of reasonable human society.

Recent developments such as the current and proposed joint measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized launches and to provide for the security of weapons transit and storage, as well as promises by the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, make us hopeful that all nuclear Powers may once again consider following the example of the USSR and China, by declaring their intention never to use nuclear weapons first and substantiating that statement with joint confidence-building measures in the area. We think that much of the road towards prohibiting a first use of nuclear weapons has been travelled already. The bold yet carefully balanced nature of the latest nuclear-arms initiatives suggests that the nuclear Powers concerned are indeed in a good position to travel down the remaining part of the road.

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There is another urgent task in this field, and I feel sure that representatives in the First Committee are not the only ones to be very well aware of this task. I am referring to the need to complete the noble endeavour of our distinguished predecessors who banned nuclear testing in outer space, in the atmosphere and under water as long ago as 1963.

Certain progress has been made in limiting nuclear testing: the 1974 and 1976 Treaties were ratified and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament has moved to considering this issue more actively. However, the principal goal - namely, a complete and comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing - still, alas, remains a remote prospect.

Ukraine, having suffered the horrible results of a "peaceful" nuclear disaster in Chernobyl, joins those who have fallen victim to the use or testing of nuclear weapons, and the millions of people who have not yet been directly affected but who do not want to put up with the looming nuclear threat, in urging all the nuclear Powers to show good will and cease nuclear testing, thus making a gigantic stride towards nuclear disarmament.

It is high time that we stopped once and for all our continuous nuclear warfare against the environment, during which dozens and hundreds of nuclear charges have been set off. This warfare is called nuclear testing. I should like to emphasize that this issue is in a class by itself, to be considered separately from its linkage to progress in disarmament. No steps in other directions can replace the need to ban nuclear testing completely and as soon as possible. The Soviet one-year moratorium, announced earlier this month, is another invitation to others to follow suit and opt for a definitive cessation of nuclear explosions - which indeed tax the patience of the people and of nature itself.

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Now that international relations are evolving and the United Nations peacemaking potential is being realized to a fuller extent, we in Ukraine regard as rather realistic and not just idealistic the idea of having step-by-step nuclear disarmament, marked by such milestones as the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, early cessation of nuclear testing, complete destruction of nuclear stockpiles, and guarantees that nuclear arms are not being produced anywhere in the world. And if the non-nuclear prospect is not to somebody's liking today, we would not rule out the possibility of preserving some agreed minimum nuclear deterrence capability.

It is also essential to achieve an early cessation of fissionable materials production for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear explosives are not used for military purposes; that is, the nuclear explosives released as a result of accelerating nuclear disarmament. These issues are indeed high on our agenda.

Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and the possibility that new nuclear States might emerge soon and that chemical weapons and their delivery vehicles might be spread around the globe, along with some other destabilizing arms and technologies, demonstrate once more how important it is to put a secure barrier in the way of proliferation of dangerous types of weapons.

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Recent developments have shown how urgent it is to introduce a strict international regime to monitor missiles and missile technology proliferation. Urgent, concerted and, first and foremost, efficient measures are required to tackle this problem.

Ukraine has unfailingly supported the establishment of nuclear-free zones. If the preparatory work is well done and if the zones are created at the initiative and with the agreement of all the nations in the region, such zones can have an effect of containment; they can encourage the renunciation of nuclear arms and consolidate stability in the region and throughout the world. When nuclear weapons are eliminated, our national territory must become a nuclear-free zone also.

Ukraine welcomes the results of the recently completed Third Review Conference on the Convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons. The results of the Conference show that disarmament agreements concluded in the past continue today to play an important role and may be adjusted to meet today's requirements.

We are indeed gratified to learn that there are good chances of completing, next year, the drafting of a most complex agreement, namely, a multilateral convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. We realize that the finishing touches of any arms-control negotiations always turn out to be the most intractable. Therefore, the negotiators are hereby urged to do their utmost to remove the differences so that work on this major arms-control instrument can be completed by the next session of the General Assembly. Ukraine neither possesses nor produces

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chemical weapons, and Ukraine will be one of the first to sign the convention on the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare.

The signing of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Paris on 19 November 1990 was definitely a landmark event last year. It consolidated the ground for genuine disarmament. The significance of this Treaty, which has paved the way for a brand-new kind of security on the continent of Europe can hardly be overestimated. Yet I wish to stress the point that, even before the Treaty entered into force, member States had resumed the Vienna talks to cover a still wider range of military and political issues. This is a good indication of the continuity and consistency in this straightforward process. However, progress in the reduction of conventional forces in Europe has not been matched by similar moves in other parts of the world, notwithstanding the fact that in recent times armed conflicts have continued to flare up in places outside of Europe. We feel that the international community should give more priority to reducing conventional armaments and armed forces in regions other than Europe, above all in areas torn by conflict. Measures to build confidence, enhance stability and strengthen good-neighbourly relations might be taken as a first step in that direction.

The implementation of the CFE Treaty, which must also have an impact on the conventional forces in Ukraine, emphatically calls for Ukraine's direct participation in any further multilateral disarmament talks as well as in the CSCE process at large. In this connection, I wish to recall once more that Ukraine has expressed its desire to participate directly in the disarmament negotiating process and is willing to make a constructive contribution to

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solving the issues at hand. After the referendum has been held, we intend to address in practical terms the question of full-fledged membership in the CSCE.

The need to close down all the main channels of the arms race means that we can hardly avoid the issue of naval forces. Ukraine, a coastal nation of the Black Sea and hence the Mediterranean basin, is quite naturally concerned by the fact that the major achievements in various disarmament matters and regional issues have until recently had little or no effect whatsoever on naval activities. We feel that the time has come for substantive negotiations on naval issues, starting with elementary confidence-building, openness and predictability measures at sea. These have already been defined to a considerable extent, and we would thus move steadily down the road of significant reductions in naval activities with a view to limiting them to purely defensive functions.

Increasing attention has lately been focused on the issue of conversion of military industries. The very first experience in large-scale conversion has proved this to be a complex and at times ambivalent problem. It has been particularly vital for us since we aim to make a formidable part of our defence industries serve civilian purposes. Clearly, this is a field that calls for international cooperation, the sharing of experience, expert studies and recommendations, some of which could be provided by the United Nations and, of course, through the Department for Disarmament Affairs. We consider that it would be very important to go step up international efforts for large-scale cooperation in the area of conversion with a view to building trust, improving mutual understanding, making arms control measures irreversible and raising the living standards of peoples. Joint conversion

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activities in and of themselves can, of course, serve both as a major confidence-building measure and as an indispensable source of the peace dividend which is to be drawn from fundamentally new approaches to consolidating international security.

(Mr. Zlenko, Ukraine)

Furthermore, conversion is equally vital to our success in limiting the arms trade and reducing the supply of weapons to international markets. Indeed, an arms manufacturer, just like any other producer, is always intent on finding markets for his products in order to provide jobs and pay wages to his employees. So in our view this raises to a high political level the issue of converting enterprises of the defence industry and shifting them to civilian production, a level which takes the issue above and beyond the usual cooperation based on mutual benefit. This makes me want to believe that our Western partners will show much greater interest in the conversion of defence enterprises in Ukraine than they are showing today.

Those remarks conclude my statement on some of the issues of disarmament. Although I dwelt on what is regarded by us as some of the most essential issues of disarmament, I did not refer to many crucial aspects of providing security through disarmament.

In conclusion, let me wish the First Committee all success in making further progress towards resolving this major problem.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to remind members that, in accordance with the decision of the Committee and as reflected in its programme of work and time-table, the list of speakers for the general debate on all disarmament items will be closed tomorrow, Tuesday, 15 October 1991, at 6 p.m. I hope that those delegations that have not yet inscribed their names on the list will do so as soon as possible.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.